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1063 
PUSHING THE LIMITS OF JURISDICTION OVER 
FOREIGN ACTORS UNDER THE FOREIGN 
CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (the “FCPA”)1 is the primary law 
used by the United States to combat global corruption and bribery. As 
anti-corruption efforts have intensified worldwide through the last two 
decades, the FCPA’s enforcement agencies, the Department of Justice 
(“DOJ”) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), have 
prioritized FCPA prosecutions.
2
 As part of these efforts, both agencies 
have signaled increasingly expansive interpretations of the FCPA’s 
jurisdictional reach, particularly over foreign individuals and companies. 
This Note examines the jurisdictional bounds of the FCPA by analyzing 
two areas where the DOJ and SEC have suggested expansive jurisdictional 
interpretations: correspondent account liability and parent-subsidiary 
liability. 
Three hypothetical scenarios help exemplify the jurisdictional 
questions addressed in this Note. Consider which of these cases fall under 
the jurisdiction of the United States: 
 Alex is a U.S. citizen who lives in Nigeria and works for a 
Canadian-owned energy company. Alex is suspicious that the 
contract payments he has been approving as part of his regular 
business duties are being used in part to bribe Nigerian officials. 
He is not certain this is true and has been doing his best to stay 
out of it and avoid confirming his suspicions.  
 Beatrice is a British citizen employed by a Swiss company. She 
approved several transfers from a company account in 
Switzerland to a client account in Japan. Beatrice recently 
discovered that some of the money was used to purchase luxury 
cars for the Japanese officials who approved the client’s 
operational license. The transfers were made in U.S. dollars. 
 Caro is a Panamanian company wholly owned by a U.S. 
company, Clare. Clare has minimal oversight over Caro’s 
business and does not review, direct, or approve any of its day-
 
 
 1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1–3 (2012). 
 2. See infra Part II.C.  
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to-day operations. Caro’s accounting team recently discovered 
that several members of its sales team have been bribing 
Brazilian officials to secure lucrative shipping contracts.  
Which of these corrupt acts can be prosecuted in the United States? 
The answer, according to the DOJ and the SEC, appears to be all of them. 
Alex is a straightforward case: U.S. citizens are subject to the FCPA, 
regardless of where they act, by virtue of their citizenship.
3
 Beatrice and 
Caro, however, mirror examples of recent expansive jurisdictional 
statements by the DOJ and SEC in FCPA prosecutions. Acts as small as 
making a transfer in U.S. dollars between foreign accounts, as Beatrice 
did, may be enough to trigger prosecution.
4
 Foreign companies may be 
liable based solely on their relationship with a U.S. company, as could be 
the case for Caro.
5
 This expansion raises important questions for 
businesses worldwide seeking to understand what their potential exposure 
to FCPA liability may be and how to design adequate anti-corruption 
compliance programs.  
This Note examines the legality and policy implications of two 
particularly amorphous jurisdictional bases, exemplified in the 
hypothetical scenarios: correspondent account liability (Beatrice) and 
parent-subsidiary liability (Caro and Clare).
6
 Part II details the history and 
development of the FCPA’s provisions and application, including the 
recent expansion in FCPA enforcement. Part III discusses the development 
of jurisdictional interpretations of the FCPA, looking particularly at the 
two jurisdictional bases in question: correspondent account and parent-
subsidiary. Parts IV (correspondent account liability) and V (parent-
subsidiary liability) analyze the legality and policy implications of recent 
applications of these jurisdictional bases in FCPA cases. The Note 
concludes that the DOJ and SEC are extending their jurisdictional reach 
too far. It proposes that a more effective FCPA strategy would result from 
a change in focus: instead of reaching everyone who may be reachable, 
 
 
 3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(a), (h)(1)(A); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL DIV. & U.S. SECS. & 
EXCH. COMM’N, ENFORCEMENT DIV., A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES 
ACT 4 (2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/guide.pdf.  
 4. See infra Part IV.  
 5. See infra Part V. 
 6. These issues and the cases giving rise to them have been identified by a number of sources. 
See, e.g., DOUGLAS N. GREENBURG ET AL., LATHAM & WATKINS LLP, PROSECUTORS WITHOUT 
BORDERS: EMERGING TRENDS IN EXTRATERRITORIAL ENFORCEMENT (2011), available at 
http://www.lw.com/upload/pubContent/_pdf/pub4122_1.pdf. This Note further expands the analysis 
on these issues.  
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agencies should strengthen collaboration with companies and foreign 
governments as they develop their own strategies to combat corruption.  
II. THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FCPA 
A. The History of the FCPA and Global Anti-Corruption Regimes 
The FCPA was enacted in 1977 as one of many changes made in 
response to Watergate and related political scandals.
7
 Prior to passing 
legislation, the federal government gauged the corruption problem by 
giving companies a liability-free opportunity to disclose fraudulent 
business practices and found that these practices were alarmingly 
common.
8
 In response, Congress unanimously passed the FCPA, citing 
concerns that corrupt business practices were hurting the U.S. economy 
and tarnishing the country’s global support for democracy and free 
markets, which was especially crucial to U.S. policy during the Cold War.
9
 
The FCPA was enacted to clean up domestic business practices and to 
protect America’s reputation and relationships abroad.10 
The FCPA was the first law in the world to prohibit international 
bribery, and initially, it was not widely used; only twenty-three 
enforcement actions were pursued during the FCPA’s first ten years.11 
This slow start was largely attributable to concerns that the FCPA’s vague 
 
 
 7. Daniel Pines, Comment, Amending the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to Include a Private 
Right of Action, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 185, 187 (1994). 
 8. See Bruce W. Klaw, A New Strategy for Preventing Bribery and Extortion in International 
Business Transactions, 49 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 303, 307 (2012); Pines, supra note 7, at 187; see also 
H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 4 (1977) (noting that over 400 corporations had admitted to making illegal 
payments, including 117 in the top Fortune 500 industries); U.S. SECS. & EXCH. COMM’N, 94TH 
CONG., REP. ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES 54 (Comm. 
Print 1976) [hereinafter SEC REPORT] (“[T]he problem of questionable and illegal corporate payments 
is, by any measure, serious and sufficiently widespread to be a cause for deep concern. Unfortunately, 
the Commission is unable to conclude that instances of illegal payments are either isolated or 
aberrations limited to a few unscrupulous individuals.”). 
 9. See SEC REPORT, supra note 8, at 54 (“Certain conclusions can be drawn from the 
Commission’s experiences to date, the many reports filed, and the reaction of the private sector 
concerning the overall impact these questionable or illegal practices have had on public confidence in 
the integrity of American business.”); see also H.R. REP. 95-640, at 4 (noting that these practices were 
“unethical . . . counter to the moral expectations and values of the American public . . . [and] bad 
business as well . . . erod[ing] public confidence in the integrity of the free market system”). 
 10. H.R. REP. 95-640, at 5; see also Andrew Brady Spalding, Unwitting Sanctions: 
Understanding Anti-Bribery Legislation as Economic Sanctions Against Emerging Markets, 62 FLA. 
L. REV. 351, 360 (2010). Spalding argues that, contrary to the commonly held perception that the 
FCPA was primarily targeted toward domestic problems, bribes “raised the issue of U.S. relations with 
foreign countries, and the solution would necessarily implicate foreign policy interests. . . . [T]he 
ensuing legislation was in fact widely understood as an instrument of foreign policy . . . .” Id. 
 11. Klaw, supra note 8, at 311; Pines, supra note 7, at 192. 
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provisions and lack of global equivalents would damage U.S. 
competitiveness in the international market.
12
 A 1981 Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) report confirmed that companies felt they 
were losing overseas business as a result of the FCPA and also that, 
“assuming all other conditions were similar, American companies could 
not successfully compete abroad against foreign competitors that were 
bribing.”13 The DOJ implemented a guidance program in 1980 to help 
clarify how the law would be applied,
14
 while the GAO stressed the need 
for the passage of similar anti-bribery conventions worldwide to level the 
playing field for U.S. businesses.
15
 Congress amended the FCPA in 1988 
and 1998 to further address these concerns and improve the efficacy of the 
Act.
16
  
The movement for international anti-bribery provisions eventually met 
some success as the Organization of American States, Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), United Nations, and a 
number of individual regions and states passed their own anti-corruption 
conventions in the 1990s–2000s.17 As the international anti-bribery regime 
grew, concerns about unilateral application to U.S. businesses lessened, 
and the U.S. government adopted an aggressive FCPA enforcement 
regime “in a renewed effort to pursue corruption at all levels and all 
branches of government.”18 The United Kingdom’s Bribery Act of 201019 
 
 
 12. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AFMD-81-34, IMPACT OF FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES 
ACT ON U.S. BUSINESS (1981), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/140/132199.pdf (“Ambiguities 
surrounding the act’s antibribery provisions have been cited as causing U.S. companies to forego 
legitimate export opportunities.”) (quoting from the Comptroller Gen.’s transmittal letter to the Pres. 
of the Senate and Speaker of the House); Pines, supra note 7, at 189–90. 
 13. AFMD-81-34, at 14. The GAO surveyed 250 randomly selected companies out of the 
country’s 1,000 largest firms. Thirty percent reported losing overseas business as a result of the FCPA 
and over sixty percent expressed concern about loss of competitive edge. Id. 
 14. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Opinion Procedure, 28 C.F.R. § 80 (2013).  
 15. AFMD-81-34, at 45–47. 
 16. Amendments to the FCPA were enacted through the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness 
Act of 1988 and The International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998. The 1998 
amendments were implemented to comply with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development Anti-Bribery Convention. See Presidential Statement on Signing the International Anti-
Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, 2 PUB. PAPERS 2011 (Nov. 10, 1998).  
 17. See, e.g., United Nations Convention Against Corruption, Oct. 31, 2003, T.I.A.S. No. 06-
1129, 2349 U.N.T.S. 41; African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, July 
11, 2003, 43 I.L.M. 5 (2004); Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Convention 
on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, Dec. 18, 
1997, 37 I.L.M. 1 (1998); Organization of American States, Inter-American Convention Against 
Corruption, Mar. 29, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 727.  
 18. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Fact Sheet: the Department of Justice Public Corruption 
Efforts (Mar. 27, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/March/08_ag_246.html 
(quoting Att’y Gen. Michael B. Mukasey). 
 19. Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23 (U.K.). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss4/6
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marked a serious step in the fight against global corruption, as its strict 
measures and international impact are, in many ways, comparable to those 
of the FCPA.
20
 
B. Nuts and Bolts of the FCPA 
The FCPA has two major sections: (1) a prohibition on bribery of 
foreign officials, and (2) accounting and reporting provisions for 
companies registered with the SEC.
21
 The anti-bribery provisions, which 
are the focus of this Note, criminalize the “offer, payment, promise to pay, 
or authorization of the payment of any money, or offer, gift, promise to 
give, or authorization of the giving of anything of value” to foreign 
officials for the purpose of obtaining or retaining business.
22
 There is an 
exception for payments or gifts made “to expedite or to secure the 
performance of a routine governmental action.”23 The statute also provides 
two affirmative defenses: defendants may be excused from liability if 
(1) the payment was legal under the written laws of the recipient’s 
country; or (2) the payment was a “reasonable and bona fide expenditure” 
toward specific, enumerated ends.
24
 
The scope of the FCPA is limited. It criminalizes improper payments to 
public officials but does not address bribes paid in the private sector.
25
 It 
can be used to prosecute only the parties who make the payments, not 
those who solicit or receive them, and only when the payers act with a 
corrupt purpose.
26
 The statute claims jurisdiction over SEC issuers and 
 
 
 20. See INCE & CO, WORLDWIDE ANTI-CORRUPTION INITIATIVES: A COMPARISON OF UK AND 
US LEGISLATION (2013), available at http://incelaw.com/documents/pdf/legal-updates/bribery-act-
update-february-2013. 
 21. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1–3 (2012). 
 22. Id. § 78dd-1(a). 
 23. Id. § 78dd-1(b). 
 24. Id. § 78dd-1(c). The “reasonable and bona fide expenditure” must be “directly related to . . . 
(A) the promotion, demonstration, or explanation of products or services; or (B) the execution or 
performance of a contract with a foreign government or agency thereof.” Id. § 78dd-1(c)(2). 
 25. This is consistent with international priorities on corruption. For example, the World Bank 
defines corruption as “the abuse of public office for private gain.” THE WORLD BANK, HELPING 
COUNTRIES COMBAT CORRUPTION: THE ROLE OF THE WORLD BANK 8 (1997), available at 
http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/corruptn/corrptn.pdf.  
 26. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-(1)(a). Klaw discusses the ambiguity surrounding what it means to act with 
a corrupt purpose. Klaw, supra note 8, at 325. He argues that there are at least two ways to interpret 
“corruptly”: broadly or narrowly. Id. A broad definition means that “one acts corruptly anytime she 
makes a payment to a foreign official to influence any official act, provided it relates to obtaining or 
retaining business.” Id. The narrow definition is that “one only acts corruptly by intending to have the 
official misuse his position, which would seemingly exclude payments made in response to coercive 
extortion that are merely intended to ensure that the official does his job and does not provide less than 
fair treatment to the payer.” Id. 
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U.S. citizens and companies worldwide, as well as foreign persons who 
violate the Act “while in the territory of the United States.”27 The FCPA is 
enforced by the DOJ and SEC and allows for civil and criminal penalties 
that may include steep fines, imprisonment, or both.
28
  
C. Current Trends in FCPA Enforcement 
The most important trend in FCPA enforcement is its rapid growth. As 
previously noted, the DOJ and SEC have significantly ramped up FCPA 
enforcement in recent years. For example, in the four-year period from 
2002 to 2006, the United States brought a total of fourteen corporate 
enforcement actions, or an average of 3.5 per year; in 2010 alone, it 
brought twenty corporate enforcement actions.
29
 Before 2006, there were 
fewer than ten individual enforcement actions a year; the numbers started 
growing in 2007, peaking with charges against forty-two individuals in 
2009.
30
 The DOJ and SEC have made it clear that increased enforcement is 
not a passing trend but rather a new norm.
31
 
 
 
 27. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(a). An “issuer” is a party who “has a class of securities registered 
pursuant to section 78l of this title or which is required to file reports under section 78o(d) of this 
title.” 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a). A “domestic concern” is 
(A) any individual who is a citizen, national, or resident of the United States; and (B) any 
corporation, partnership, association, joint-stock company, business trust, unincorporated 
organization, or sole proprietorship which has its principal place of business in the United 
States, or which is organized under the laws of a State of the United States or a territory, 
possession, or commonwealth of the United States. 
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(1). 
 28. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(g)(1)-(3), 78dd-3(e)(1)-(3). The DOJ handles all criminal cases as well 
as civil anti-bribery cases involving domestic concerns and foreign actors. The SEC has jurisdiction 
only over anti-bribery actions against issuers. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL DIV. & U.S. SECS. & 
EXCH COMM’N, ENFORCEMENT DIV., A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES 
ACT 4–5 (2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/guide.pdf. 
 29. SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, FCPA DIGEST: RECENT TRENDS AND PATTERNS IN THE 
ENFORCEMENT OF THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 1 (2012), available at http://www.Shear 
man.com/~/media/Files/NewsInsights/Publications/2012/01/Shearman%20%20Sterlings%20Recent%20
Trends%20and%20Patterns%20i__/Files/View%20January%202012%20iRecent%20Trends%20and% 
20Patterns%20in__/FileAttachment/FCPADigestTrendsandPatternsJan2012.pdf. 
 30. Id. at 3. These numbers are partially attributable to large cases with numerous defendants, 
particularly the Africa Sting (“SHOT show”) indictments of 2009; the Siemens indictments of 2011 
had a similar effect on the statistics. Id. at 2–3; see also GREENBURG ET AL., supra note 6, at 19 
(noting that one of the key lessons of the Africa sting case is that “corporate executives must be aware 
that the U.S. will not shy away from the use of novel and innovative investigative tactics to quash 
corruption”). 
 31. In a speech at the 24th National Conference on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, former 
Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer encouraged increased compliance efforts by businesses in 
light of the DOJ’s increased enforcement efforts: 
On one hand, I want to tell you this afternoon that you are right to be more concerned. As our 
track record over the last year makes clear, we are in a new era of FCPA enforcement; and we 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss4/6
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Another key trend in FCPA enforcement is the increased move toward 
prosecuting individual actors rather than focusing primarily on company-
wide enforcement.
32
 This change is likely intended to inspire more 
individual accountability in decision making and to avoid allowing 
“companies to calculate FCPA settlements as the cost of doing 
business.”33 It also raises the stakes substantially for individuals by 
increasing the likelihood of jail time and personal financial loss. The 
average FCPA sentence is around two years, but penalties vary widely; in 
2011, one former executive was sentenced to fifteen years for his role in a 
bribery scheme.
34
 
The impact of the FCPA on global businesses is huge. The average 
FCPA case lasts 3.4 years from investigation to settlement,
35
 resulting in 
large defense bills, increased compliance costs, hefty settlement fines, and, 
in some cases, imprisonment for the most culpable individual actors. SEC 
charges settled for more than $138.3 million in 2012 alone.
36
 Increased 
FCPA enforcement is meant to improve the global marketplace for 
businesses by decreasing corruption and increasing fairness. But it also 
creates serious risks for all businesses operating in any way within the 
United States. One of the biggest questions facing businesses, then, is 
what it means to act “within” the United States. The FCPA does not 
provide for unlimited jurisdiction; it applies only to U.S. citizens and 
companies, SEC issuers, and other individuals who act corruptly “within” 
the United States. The next Part examines the statute’s grounds for 
jurisdiction. 
 
 
are here to stay. On the other hand, I want to impress upon you that you should not wait in 
worry for us to come knocking on your door. There are many steps that you can be taking that 
would put your organization in a better position for the day we do come knocking, or that 
could prevent us from coming at all.  
Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Speech at the 24th National Conference 
on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 16, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/ 
speeches/2010/crm-speech-101116.html. 
 32. SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, supra note 29, at 2–3. 
 33. DOJ Prosecution of Individuals—Are Other Factors at Play?, FCPA PROFESSOR (Jan. 29, 
2013), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/doj-prosecution-of-individuals-are-other-factors-at-play-2. 
 34. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Executive Sentenced to 15 Years in Prison for Scheme 
to Bribe Officials at State-Owned Telecommunications Company in Haiti (Oct. 25, 2011), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/October/11-crm-1407.html; Richard L. Cassin, A Survey of FCPA 
Sentences, THE FPCA BLOG (Feb. 28, 2012, 5:28 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2012/2/28/a-
survey-of-fcpa-sentences.html.  
 35. Joe Palazzolo, Does the FCPA Move Markets?, WALL ST. J. BLOG (Oct. 2, 2012, 11:12 AM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-currents/2012/10/02/does-the-fcpa-move-markets. 
 36. SEC Enforcement Actions: FCPA Cases, U.S. SECS. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/ 
spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-cases.shtml (last modified Jan. 9, 2014). 
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III. THE JURISDICTION OF THE FCPA  
The jurisdictional reach of the FCPA has expanded significantly over 
time. Some of those changes came through statutory amendment in 
response to problematic gaps in the law. Others have come about in 
practice as the DOJ and SEC have charged and settled cases that include 
expanded jurisdictional bases. This Part gives a brief background on the 
development of jurisdiction under the statute.  
When the FCPA was enacted in 1977, Congress explicitly excluded 
foreign actors from its reach unless they otherwise fell under the 
jurisdiction of the United States.
37
 Case law from the first two decades of 
FCPA enforcement discussed the rationale behind this intentional 
exclusion. The courts and Congress were concerned with issues of 
sovereignty, U.S. foreign policy and relations, and risks of reciprocal 
prosecution.
38
 
This exclusion ended with the 1998 amendments to the FCPA. In that 
year, Congress amended the FCPA to implement the OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention.
39
 The 1998 amendment followed the OECD Convention in 
declaring territorial jurisdiction over acts that were committed or occurred 
“within” the United States.40  
 
 
 37. “[T]he conferees determined that foreign nationals or residents otherwise under the 
jurisdiction of the United States would be covered by the bill in circumstances where an issuer or 
domestic concern engaged in conduct proscribed by the bill.” H.R. REP. No. 95-831, at 14 (1977) 
(Conf. Rep.).  
 38. The court in Dooley v. United Techs. Corp., for example, held that it lacked jurisdiction over 
certain defendants after examining congressional intent in limiting the FCPA’s reach over foreign 
individuals and corporations. One of its primary concerns was international comity. 803 F. Supp. 428, 
438–40 (D.D.C. 1992). International comity is a principle that extraterritorial jurisdiction should be 
limited “out of respect for foreign sovereignty. International comity requires courts to balance 
competing public and private interests in a manner that takes into account any conflict between the 
public policies of the domestic and foreign sovereigns.” Joel R. Paul, The Transformation of 
International Comity, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 2008, at 19, 19 (footnote omitted). The 
court in United States v. Castle, cited two major concerns that led to the enactment of the FCPA: (1) 
concern about the domestic effect of corrupt payments, and (2) the effect of bribes on U.S. foreign 
relations. 925 F.2d 831, 834 (5th Cir. 1991). 
 39. See supra text accompanying note 16. 
 40. In Article 4, Paragraph 1, the OECD Convention states that “[e]ach Party shall take such 
measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the bribery of a foreign public official 
when the offence is committed in whole or in part in its territory.” Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development, Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions art. 4, para. 1, Dec. 18, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1 (1998). Territorial 
jurisdiction is also defined in the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations: “Subject to § 403, a state 
has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to . . . conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes 
place within its territory.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 402 (1987). Section 403 deals with limitations on jurisdiction to prescribe, which mainly 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss4/6
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“Within” has a particular meaning in this context: to commit an act 
“within” the territory actually means causing an act to be committed 
within the territory.
41
 The 1998 amendment thus established jurisdiction 
over anyone who uses the mails, means, or instrumentalities of interstate 
commerce in the United States to facilitate an FCPA violation, even if that 
person was not physically present in the United States when acting or 
otherwise subject to U.S. jurisdiction as a citizen or issuer.
42
 The 1998 
amendment significantly expanded the FCPA’s reach, allowing “US 
enforcement agencies [to] make use of [the FCPA’s] extraterritorial 
provisions . . . to exert jurisdiction on the basis of actions as slight as 
registering American Depository Receipts, sending incriminating emails, 
or making a transfer to a US bank account.”43 
The application of when an act occurs “within” the United States can 
be unclear. Some examples are straightforward: an individual who offers a 
bribe to a foreign official during a meeting in New York has violated the 
FCPA “within” the United States, as has a company who opens a U.S. 
bank account to facilitate prohibited payments. Other applications, though, 
are much less obvious. Going back to the introductory hypotheticals, did 
Beatrice violate the FCPA if her transaction’s only connection to the 
United States was that it was made in U.S. dollars? Is Caro subject to 
FCPA jurisdiction even though its only jurisdictional contact with the 
United States is its U.S. parent, Clare? These examples demonstrate two 
new—and potentially troubling—bases for jurisdiction that the DOJ and 
SEC have recently advocated under the FCPA: (1) correspondent account 
liability and (2) parent-subsidiary liability, specifically, assumed agency. 
These jurisdictional bases, which push traditional notions of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction, are explored in turn in the next two Parts.  
 
 
derive from an examination of whether or not the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable. RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403 (1987).  
 41. SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, THE OTHER FCPA SHOE DROPS: EXPANDED JURISDICTION 
OVER NON-U.S. COMPANIES, FOREIGN MONITORS, AND EXTENDING COMPLIANCE CONTROLS TO NON-
U.S. COMPANIES 2 (2010), available at http://www.shearman.com/the-other-fcpa-shoe-drops—
expanded-jurisdiction-over-non-us-companies-foreign-monitors-and-extending-compliance-controls-
to-non-us-companies-07-19-2010 (follow “View full memo” hyperlink). 
 42. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3 (2012). 
 43. ARNOLD & PORTER LLP, THE EXTRATERRITORIAL REACH OF THE FCPA AND THE UK 
BRIBERY ACT: IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 3 (2012), available at http://www.arnold 
porter.com/resources/documents/Advisory%20Extraterritorial_Reach_FCPA_and_UK_Bribery%20Act_ 
Implications_International_Business.pdf. For a more detailed explanation of the reach of Section 78dd-
3, see H. Lowell Brown, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Under the 1998 Amendments to the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act: Does the Government’s Reach Now Exceed its Grasp?, 26 N.C. J. INT’L L. & 
COM. REG. 239, 303–17 (2001). 
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IV. CORRESPONDENT ACCOUNT LIABILITY 
A. The Basics of Correspondent Account Liability 
When banks wish to transact in a location where they do not have a 
branch, they can use a correspondent account in that location to conduct 
transactions, such as receiving deposits or making payments. Foreign 
banks use U.S. correspondent accounts to facilitate U.S. dollar 
transactions, as Beatrice did in the second hypothetical. In recent 
enforcement actions, the DOJ and SEC have signaled that the use of U.S. 
correspondent accounts can establish jurisdiction over the foreign actor 
conducting the transaction, even when that correspondent account is the 
actor’s only link to the United States.44 Thus, if a foreign actor uses a U.S.-
based correspondent account to bribe another foreign actor, the 
government’s new theory would permit a criminal prosecution for bribery 
in federal court. 
This novel approach to FCPA jurisdiction creates problems. It raises 
questions about whether these defendants have adequate notice and it 
could also interfere with foreign relations and international comity.
45
 On a 
more practical level, jurisdiction via correspondent account liability makes 
it difficult for companies to design effective compliance programs and 
creates uncertainty for domestic and foreign businesses.  
Neither enforcing agency has used correspondent account liability as a 
stand-alone jurisdictional basis; rather, they have cited it in cases where 
they otherwise have jurisdiction but nonetheless have differentiated 
between foreign transactions that use a correspondent account (within the 
United States) and foreign transactions that do not use a correspondent 
account (outside the United States).
46
 FCPA cases rarely go to trial, 
jurisdictional challenges are rare, and correspondent account liability has 
 
 
 44. SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, supra note 41, at 2. This argument is the strongest if the 
money clears through one of the U.S.’s two primary clearing systems: the Clearing House Interbank 
Payment System (CHIPS), which is the world’s largest private sector transfer system for U.S. dollars, 
or Fedwire, the Federal Reserve’s funds transfer system. Michael Gruson, The U.S. Jurisdiction over 
Transfers of U.S. Dollars Between Foreigners and over Ownership of U.S. Dollar Accounts in Foreign 
Banks, 2004 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 721, 725–26; THE CLEARING HOUSE, http://www.chips.org/ 
home.php (last visited Jan. 31, 2013); Fedwire Funds Services, THE FED. RESERVE, http://www. 
federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/fedfunds_about.htm (last updated Feb. 19, 2014). It is possible to 
move U.S. dollars between foreign accounts outside of these systems, which would make the 
jurisdictional argument more difficult. 
 45. See infra Part IV.B.2.  
 46. See, e.g., Information, United States v. Kellogg Brown & Root LLC, No. 09-CR-071 (S.D. 
Tex. Feb. 6. 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/kelloggb/02-06-09 
kbr-info.pdf (compare treatment of Counts 2–3 with treatment of Counts 4–5). 
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not yet been squarely challenged in federal court, meaning there is little 
guidance on how judges may view correspondent account liability in these 
cases.
47
 But outside the correspondent account liability context, courts 
have followed the Restatement’s approach when determining whether an 
exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable and satisfies due process 
requirements. Cases addressing challenges to the extraterritorial 
applications of U.S. law in other contexts thus help in predicting how a 
court would decide a challenge to correspondent account liability.  
B. The Restatement’s Three-Part Reasonableness Test 
Section 402 of the Restatement lists several situations in which a state 
may assert jurisdiction over domestic or foreign actors, including:  
(1) territorial jurisdiction when the conduct occurs within the state’s 
borders; 
(2) universal jurisdiction over persons or things within a state’s 
territory; 
(3) jurisdiction over people whose conduct has effects within a 
state’s territory (sometimes called objective territorial jurisdiction);  
(4) jurisdiction based on the nationality of the offender or victim; 
and,  
(5) jurisdiction over a person or thing when doing so protects state 
security or other specific state interests.
48
  
Territorial jurisdiction over the conduct at issue, under Section 
402(1)(a), provides the clearest argument for correspondent account 
liability. The relevant conduct within U.S. territory would be the use of a 
U.S. bank account to clear funds, which is a use of the mails, means, or 
instrumentalities of interstate commerce.
49
 Thus, in Beatrice’s case, if her 
 
 
 47. Furthermore, practitioners are concerned that these jurisdictional questions will not be raised 
for practical reasons; the cost of raising a challenge would likely be too high given the uncertainty of 
prevailing. See ARNOLD & PORTER LLP, supra note 43, at 3.  
 48. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402 (1987). 
 49. Section 78dd-3 requires the nexus to interstate commerce for foreign nationals charged under 
the FCPA. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(a) (2012). The argument for jurisdiction over correspondent accounts 
under Section 402(1)(a) of the Restatement may fail even without the limitations of Section 403 
because Section 402(1)(a) gives jurisdiction for conduct that “wholly or in substantial part” occurs in 
the territory. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§§ 402(1)(a), 403. There is a strong argument that the mere fact that money clears through a 
correspondent account on its way between two foreign accounts is insufficient to meet this threshold. 
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transfer cleared through a U.S. account on its way between the Swiss and 
Japanese accounts, the clearance through a U.S. account could provide the 
sole jurisdictional contact that would subject her to FCPA jurisdiction.  
Section 402’s jurisdictional bases are quite broad. To keep jurisdiction 
from reaching too broadly, the Restatement requires that any exercise of 
jurisdiction also satisfy the limits of Section 403. Section 403 provides 
that “[e]ven when one of the bases for jurisdiction under § 402 is present, 
a state may not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to a 
person or activity having connections with another state when the exercise 
of such jurisdiction is unreasonable.”50 The question, then, is whether 
correspondent account liability is “unreasonable.” The Restatement 
outlines three issues that courts should examine when answering this 
question: (1) the nexus between the defendants, their conduct, and the 
charging state; (2) international norms regarding regulation of the activity 
in question and exercise of jurisdiction over the offense or person; and 
(3) a balance of interests (that is, a weighing of the importance of the 
regulation to the charging state and the likelihood that its actions would 
conflict with the interests of another state or other systemic interests).
51
 As 
discussed below, all three of these factors suggest that jurisdiction via 
correspondent account liability is improper. 
1. Adequate Nexus 
The first prong of the reasonableness test—adequate nexus—examines 
the connection between the United States and the actor or acts. Courts 
have held that this standard is met “[w]here an attempted transaction is 
aimed at causing criminal acts within the United States”52 or where actions 
were “likely to have effects in the United States.”53 For example, in cases 
of drug seizures in international waters, courts generally have held that an 
adequate nexus exists when there is evidence that the drugs are headed 
toward the United States. Although the defendants were captured in 
international waters and thus had not yet taken any action within the 
United States, sale and use of the drugs would presumably have occurred 
there.
54
 In such cases, courts have determined that the connection between 
 
 
 50. Id. § 403(1). 
 51. Id. § 403(2). 
 52. United States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 486, 493 (9th Cir. 1987). 
 53. United States v. Klimavicius-Viloria, 144 F.3d 1249, 1257 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting United 
States v. Khan, 35 F.3d 426, 429 (9th Cir. 1994)). 
 54. Id. at 1257–59; Peterson, 812 F.2d at 493. Similar reasoning was applied in Chua Han Mow 
v. United States, where all actions occurred in Malaysia but were intended to cause harm in the United 
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the defendant and the United States is strong enough that exercising 
jurisdiction over the defendant would not be “arbitrary or fundamentally 
unfair.”55 Similarly, foreign conspiracies to smuggle immigrants into the 
United States likely have an adequate nexus because the intended effects 
of the conspiracy will be felt in the United States, even when all of the 
illegal acts occur abroad.
56
 
In the correspondent account context, the movement of corrupt 
payments through a U.S. account arguably causes a criminal act to occur 
in the United States, such that an adequate nexus exists. But, as the 
examples just discussed illustrate, this conclusion has at least two major 
flaws. 
First, correspondent account liability does not cause sufficient harm to 
create an adequate nexus. Courts look for a cognizable harm occurring 
within the United States, such as the entry of drugs or undocumented 
immigrants. Use of correspondent accounts, however, causes no apparent 
harm within the United States. The only arguable harm is the impact any 
corrupt act will have on the global economy. But such a harm is far too 
attenuated to provide an adequate nexus; otherwise, any corrupt act—
wherever it occurred—could have an adequate nexus to the United States. 
Second, those using correspondent accounts often lack the intent to 
commit a criminal act or cause harm within the United States. Cases in 
which courts have found an adequate nexus often involve such intent, but 
in correspondent account cases, defendants may not have this intent. There 
is a risk, then, that jurisdiction over them would be arbitrary and unfair. 
Courts’ applications of federal securities law provide helpful 
comparisons.
57
 Under these laws, courts have held that the mere use of a 
U.S. bank to clear a check is sufficient to establish territorial jurisdiction 
and to create an adequate nexus.
58
 “[J]urisdiction predicated on the use of 
the instrumentalities of interstate commerce is extremely broad, and it 
comprehends the involvement of virtually any channel of interstate 
 
 
States. 730 F.2d 1308, 1312 (9th Cir. 1984). In these cases, the analyses for territorial jurisdiction and 
objective territorial jurisdiction are largely the same. 
 55. United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 249 (9th Cir. 1990). 
 56. Rocha v. United States, 288 F.2d 545, 548 (9th Cir. 1961). 
 57. See, e.g., United States v. Kunzman, 54 F.3d 1522, 1527 (10th Cir. 1995) (“As long as the 
instrumentality used is itself an integral part of an interstate system, Congress may regulate intrastate 
activities involving the use of the instrumentality under the federal securities laws.”). 
 58. See, e.g., United States v. Gilbert, 181 F.3d 152, 158–59 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that making 
a bomb threat over the telephone, even if the call is intrastate, creates a sufficient nexus to interstate 
commerce to confer jurisdiction); Kunzman, 54 F.3d at 1527 (finding that jurisdiction is established if 
transactions occur in FDIC-insured banks or there is some minimal connection between the action and 
the integral parts of interstate commerce). 
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commerce . . . so long as that channel is used in furtherance of the 
violation.”59 The use does not need to be the primary means of 
accomplishing the corrupt act,
60
 nor does it necessarily have to be used 
directly by the defendant.
61
 
At first glance, jurisdiction via correspondent account liability seems 
similar. But an important difference exists—intent. In securities and 
money laundering cases, the defendants intentionally drew and deposited 
checks at U.S. banks, causing movement across state banks and the use of 
interstate commerce.
62
 The defendants knew that they were using the U.S. 
national banking system and thus had reason to know they were subjecting 
themselves to federal law.
63
 In contrast, defendants in FCPA actions may 
not know nor have any reason to know that their funds would move 
through a U.S. account. They use foreign accounts; money might travel, 
for example, from a Swiss bank to a Japanese bank. It is the foreign 
banks—not the defendants—that use U.S. correspondent accounts. 
A court could find that this connection gives defendants insufficient 
notice that their actions would subject them to U.S. jurisdiction, which 
would violate due process requirements of “fair play and substantial 
justice”64 and the reasonableness test’s standard that jurisdiction not be 
“arbitrary or fundamentally unfair.”65 These defendants do not cause a 
cognizable harm in the United States, nor do they intend to. Their contact 
with the United States is extremely minimal, and they may not even know 
it is occurring. Thus this contact alone is insufficient to establish an 
adequate nexus between foreign actors and the United States.  
 
 
 59. Brown, supra note 43, at 317. 
 60. McLaury v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 691 F. Supp. 1090, 1095 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (“It is not 
necessary that the fraud be committed during and through the actual use of the jurisdictional means; to 
be a violation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 it is sufficient if the jurisdictional means are used in 
connection with a fraudulent scheme.”). 
 61. Id.  
 62. See Kunzman, 54 F.3d at 1527 (defendant charged with securities fraud, mail fraud, wire 
fraud, money laundering, and bank fraud); McLaury, 691 F. Supp. at 1095 (defendants charged with 
violations of Section 10 of Securities and Exchange Act). 
 63. The defendants in McLaury claimed the checks never left the Illinois and thus were not 
subject to federal jurisdiction. 691 F. Supp. at 1095. But, the court found that the national banking 
system is sufficiently integrated such that its use constitutes use of the mails, means, or 
instrumentalities of interstate commerce. Id. 
 64. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (citing from Milliken v. Meyer, 311 
U.S. 457 ( 1940)) (establishing the accepted standard for the basis of personal jurisdiction). 
 65. United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 249 (9th Cir. 1990).  
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2. Comportment with International Norms 
The second prong of the reasonableness test—comportment with 
international norms—asks two questions: (1) whether Congress intended 
the statute to apply extraterritorially, and (2) whether the exercise of 
jurisdiction aligns with principles of international law, as outlined in 
Sections 401 through 403 of the Restatement. These two factors work 
together: “[i]n determining whether a statute applies extraterritorially, 
[courts] . . . presume that Congress does not intend to violate principles of 
international law.”66 
The difficulty comes in identifying widely accepted principles of 
international law. One commonly held principle is that extraterritorial 
jurisdiction is appropriate under international law when the offense is 
“serious and universally condemned,” making it unlikely that conflict 
would arise from the exercise of jurisdiction.
67
 Courts have divided, 
however, over which offenses meet this threshold.
68
 Some law-of-nations 
violations are clearly defined, such as genocide and crimes against 
ambassadors. Jurisdiction is also frequently granted when U.S. citizens are 
injured.
69
 But ambiguity still exists in interpreting these violations and in 
determining what other offenses are “serious and universally condemned.” 
Since Congress clearly intended for the FCPA to have extraterritorial 
applications, the analysis should focus on whether correspondent account 
liability aligns with international law. As previously noted, territorial 
jurisdiction technically could exist because a transfer occurs within the 
United States. But the reasonableness analysis also includes an 
examination of international norms, which focuses particularly on the 
potential for conflict between states when one reaches too far into the 
affairs of another. 
 
 
 66. United States v. Vasquez-Velasco, 15 F.3d 833, 839 (9th Cir. 1994). The court in Vasquez-
Velasco stated that there is a presumption against extraterritoriality for statutes that violate principles 
of international law unless Congress clearly directs the statute’s extraterritorial application. Id. 
 67. See, e.g., id. at 841 (reasoning that since “drug smuggling is a serious and universally 
condemned offense, no conflict is likely to be created by extraterritorial regulation of drug 
traffickers”). 
 68. See, e.g., United States v. Bellaizac-Hurtado, 700 F.3d 1245 (11th Cir. 2012). In holding that 
drug trafficking does not constitute a violation of the law of nations such that Congress has the ability 
to regulate it without another jurisdictional connection, id. at 1258, the court in Bellaizac-Hurtado 
directly contradicts the outcome in Vasquez-Velasco. 
 69. See, e.g., United States v. Neil, 312 F.3d 419 (9th Cir. 2002). The defendant in Neil was a 
foreign citizen who assaulted a twelve-year-old U.S. citizen on a cruise ship. Id. at 420. The court 
applied an effects analysis and the passive personality principle to find jurisdiction. Id. at 422. 
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State autonomy is a key principle in international law. Indeed, “[a] 
corollary to the territorial principle is that foreign governments do not 
have the right to interfere in the affairs of another state.”70 States are thus 
not allowed to regulate foreign actors without a clear jurisdictional nexus 
unless their crimes violate the law of nations.
71
 The law of nations 
encompasses only a limited number of crimes considered universally 
egregious and harmful to global peace, such as piracy and war crimes.
72
 
Congress has the authority to define law-of-nations offenses.
73
 The 
Supreme Court has been extremely cautious about otherwise expanding 
law-of-nations definitions, noting that “courts should require any claim 
based on the present-day law of nations to rest on a norm of international 
character accepted by the civilized world.”74 
Corruption does not meet this threshold. Corruption is globally harmful 
but it has not been identified by Congress as a law-of-nations violation, 
nor is there international consensus surrounding its treatment. The 
problem varies widely based on the political, economic, and cultural 
conditions of a country or region, and some view corruption as little more 
than a necessary part of doing business.
75
 The Supreme Court has not 
granted law-of-nations violations even in extreme cases, such as when 
U.S. officials ordered an illegal, international kidnapping and extradition.
76
 
The Court has held that an offense must “[violate a] norm of customary 
international law so well defined as to support the creation of a federal 
remedy.”77 Corruption does not meet this threshold.78 Thus, there must be 
 
 
 70. Gruson, supra note 44, at 761. 
 71. In the United States, the “law of nations” concept it is most commonly referenced in cases 
arising under the Alien Tort Statute, which provides that “district courts shall have original jurisdiction 
of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of 
the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012). 
 72. For an explanation by the Supreme Court of the law of nations, see Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 
542 U.S. 692, 714–20 (2004). 
 73. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 26 (1942). 
 74. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725. The Court continued with an extremely cautious analysis, noting that 
“the potential implications for the foreign relations of the United States of recognizing such causes 
should make courts particularly wary of impinging on the discretion of the Legislative and Executive 
Branches in managing foreign affairs.” Id. at 727. 
 75. See, e.g., TRANSPARENCY INT’L, GLOBAL CORRUPTION BAROMETER 2013 (2013), available 
at http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/pub/global_corruption_barometer_2013 (follow “Download 
the report”); Steven R. Salbu, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act as a Threat to Global Harmony, 20 
MICH. J. INT’L L. 419 (1999). 
 76. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 697–98. 
 77. Id. at 738. 
 78. Other authors have argued that corruption could fall under the law of nations, which led me 
to examine the law of nations as part of the international norms analysis. See, e.g., Evan P. Lestelle, 
Comment, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, International Norms of Foreign Public Bribery, and 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 83 TUL. L. REV. 527 (2008). 
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a clear jurisdictional nexus for prosecution to satisfy international norms. 
As the nexus analysis demonstrated, that does not exist for correspondent 
account liability. Thus, it does not comport with international norms. 
3. Balancing of Interests 
The third prong of the reasonableness test—balancing of interests—
examines the interests of the charging state in applying its law versus the 
interests of other states in regulating the prohibited activity (or in not 
being regulated themselves). These concerns are serious, as experience 
with the FCPA’s old exclusion of foreign companies and officials 
demonstrates. Before Congress amended the FCPA in 1998 to allow 
prosecution of foreign actors, courts stuck close to Congress’s clear intent 
to exclude them from U.S. prosecution. Courts cited Congress’s concerns 
with “international comity[,] . . . diplomatic difficulties[,] and 
jurisdictional contacts” that could arise if these actors were prosecuted 
under the FCPA.
79
 In other words, courts were worried that if they 
prosecuted foreign actors under the FCPA, they would cause foreign-
relations problems or unpredictable retaliation from other countries. 
Though foreign actors are now within the reach of the FCPA, these 
same concerns remain relevant. Aggressive prosecution can damage 
relationships with other countries who disagree with U.S. treatment of 
their companies or nationals. States also argue that U.S. prosecution 
interferes with the development of their own anti-corruption regimes.
80
 
Aggressive FCPA prosecution clearly has the potential to damage 
international relationships when it prioritizes U.S. goals over host 
countries’ concerns. 
A reasonable prosecution strategy also serves U.S. interests. The 
United States has an interest in fighting criminal activity and reducing 
corruption.
81
 Aggressive prosecution may help U.S. businesses stay 
competitive when other countries are failing to prosecute corruption 
effectively. But the United States does not have the prosecutorial resources 
 
 
 79. Dooley v. United Techs. Corp., 803 F. Supp. 428, 439 (D.D.C. 1992); see also United States 
v. Castle, 925 F.2d 831, 835–36 (5th Cir. 1991). 
 80. See Salbu, supra note 75, at 440. Salbu notes “encouraging nations to adopt and implement 
their own domestic antibribery laws is the solution to corruption most respectful of legitimate cultural 
differences.” Id. 
 81. Brown uses a “conduct test” that focuses on “acts committed within the territorial United 
States and seeks to vindicate the national interest by preventing the United States from becoming a 
haven for criminality,” but notes that “courts do not fully agree on the nature of conduct required to 
engender subject matter jurisdiction, particularly where a transaction or fraudulent scheme has not had 
a significant effect in the United States.” Brown, supra note 43, at 324–25. 
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to reach every crooked scheme. Sustainable progress will be made when 
all of the major global players have effective anti-corruption regimes, but 
they need an opportunity to develop them.
82
  
Expansive prosecution could also redirect business away from the 
United States. For example, in correspondent account cases, the DOJ 
distinguishes between bank transfers that clear through U.S. correspondent 
accounts (within the United States) and ones that do not (outside the 
United States).
83
 A company could thus avoid FCPA liability simply by 
transacting in yens or euros instead of dollars, cutting the correspondent 
account and, therefore, eliminating its U.S. connection. That scenario is all 
loss for the United States: a U.S. bank loses a transaction, U.S. currency 
loses an exchange, and corruption continues unabated. 
Correspondent account liability does not satisfy any of the three prongs 
of the reasonableness test. It does not create an adequate nexus: defendants 
lack sufficient contact with the United States, and they do not intend to 
cause, nor do they actually cause, harm here. It does not comport with 
international norms. The only exception to traditional jurisdictional 
requirements in international law is for law-of-nations violations, where 
any state is presumed to have some jurisdiction over a perpetrator. 
Corruption is not a law-of-nations violation; thus, prosecution without 
jurisdiction violates international norms. Finally, in the balancing of 
interests, no one is well-served by aggressive U.S. prosecution. Other 
states have an interest in growing and receiving support for their own anti-
corruption regimes. The United States has an interest in sharing the 
prosecutorial load and supporting U.S. businesses. All of these interests 
are best served by a reasonable prosecution strategy that focuses on 
compliance and global buy-in rather than just policing and punishing. 
V. PARENT-SUBSIDIARY LIABILITY 
The second jurisdictional basis that has been asserted in a novel 
manner in FCPA enforcement is parent-subsidiary liability, specifically, 
liability based on an agency relationship. As a general rule, parents and 
 
 
 82. Many nations are indeed developing their own anti-corruption regimes. See, e.g., Richard L. 
Cassin, Africa nations shut down tainted China telecoms deals, THE FCPA BLOG (Sept. 19, 2013, 3:08 
AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2013/9/19/africa-nations-shut-down-tainted-china-telecoms-deals. 
html; Richard L. Cassin, Life sentence for Bo Xilai, THE FCPA BLOG (Sept. 22, 2013, 9:22 PM), 
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2013/9/22/life-sentence-for-bo-xilai.html.  
 83. See, e.g., Information, United States v. Kellogg Brown & Root LLC, No. 09-CR-071 (S.D. 
Tex. Feb. 6. 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/kelloggb/02-06-09 
kbr-info.pdf (compare treatment of Counts 2–3 with treatment of Counts 4–5). 
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subsidiaries are treated as separate entities for liability purposes. Neither 
side is responsible for the acts of the other, and jurisdiction over one does 
not create jurisdiction over the other.
84
 But, there are exceptions to this 
rule.
85
 One of these exceptions is that a parent and subsidiary may both be 
held liable for the subsidiary’s actions when the subsidiary was acting as 
an agent of the parent.
86
 If an agency relationship is established, 
jurisdiction over the U.S. party can be extended so that jurisdiction over 
the foreign party is also appropriate.
87
  
Under the FCPA, the United States has jurisdiction over foreign actors 
who operate as authorized agents of a U.S. company, including foreign 
subsidiaries of U.S. parents.
88
 Thus, in the third hypothetical, if the United 
States could prove that Caro was acting as an authorized agent of Clare 
when it committed acts that would violate the FCPA, the United States 
could exercise jurisdiction over Caro by virtue of its jurisdiction over 
Clare. The issue with this application is that the SEC has signaled recently 
that it may assert FCPA jurisdiction over non-issuer subsidiaries based 
solely on their relationship with an issuer parent, without proving a 
principal-agent relationship existes.
89
 This lack of proof of a principal-
agent relationship presents possibilities for conflict with agency law and 
the liability structure of parent-subsidiary relationships.  
This question of imputing jurisdiction is complicated. Typically, 
parent-subsidiary liability questions focus on when a parent may be held 
responsible for the illegal acts of its subsidiary, i.e., when a plaintiff may 
“pierce the corporate veil.” The SEC’s application, though, is different: it 
is using the parent-subsidiary relationship to establish jurisdiction over a 
party that would otherwise be out of reach. It thus seeks to extend its 
 
 
 84. “It is a general principle of corporate law deeply ‘ingrained in our economic and legal 
systems’ that a parent corporation . . . is not liable for the acts of its subsidiaries.” United States v. 
Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 61 (1998) (quoting William O. Douglas & Carrol M. Shanks, Insulation from 
Liability Through Subsidiary Corporations, 39 YALE L.J. 193, 193 (1929)). 
 85. Courts have not established a clear test for determining parent-subsidiary liability but have 
found liability based on a number of theories, including “(1) agency, (2) instrumentality, (3) identity or 
alter ego, (4) fraud, and (5) abuse of control or inequitable use of the separate entity privilege.” 1 
JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 7:16 (3d. ed. 
2011) (footnotes omitted). 
 86. See id.  
 87. See, e.g., Chan v. Soc’y Expeditions, Inc., 39 F.3d 1398, 1404 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 88. All three sections of FCPA legislation claim jurisdiction over agents acting on behalf of the 
enumerated parties (issuers, domestic concerns, or other persons acting in the territory of the United 
States). 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1–3 (2012). 
 89. The clearest example of this appeared in the SEC action against Snamprogetti Netherlands in 
the Bonny Island bribery case. Information, United States v. Snamprogetti Neth. B.V., No. 10-CR-460 
(S.D. Tex. July 7, 2010).  
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jurisdiction over a parent company to that parent’s subsidiary, over whom 
they do not have jurisdiction otherwise, by arguing that the subsidiary 
acted as an agent of the parent. There is no clear test for determining when 
jurisdiction or liability may be imputed from a parent to subsidiary (or 
vice versa). This Part analyzes the legal principles that the SEC may have 
to apply to exercise jurisdiction over a foreign party based on its 
relationship with a U.S. parent. 
A. Basics of Parent-Subsidiary Structure 
The parent-subsidiary structure is a limited liability arrangement that 
serves largely “to minimize the potential liability of the parent company 
for the operations and potential claims against its operating subsidiaries.”90 
But plaintiffs frequently seek to “pierce the corporate veil,” which means 
they ask courts to “[disregard] the veil of incorporation that separates the 
property of a corporation from the property of its security holders.”91 
Courts will allow the veil to be pierced, i.e., disregard the corporate 
limited liability form, when “the corporate form would otherwise be 
misused to accomplish certain wrongful purposes.”92  
If the veil is pierced, plaintiffs can access the assets of the parent 
corporation or individual owners or stockholders, exposing these parties to 
additional liability and potentially giving the plaintiffs access to more 
funds for recovery. Indeed, “[g]iven the massive financial assets of many 
multinational parent corporations, actions seeking to ignore the legal 
separateness of a corporate subsidiary of a parent company offer some of 
the biggest potential payoffs for claimants.”93 Given this potential for 
damages, attempts to pierce the veil are fiercely and frequently litigated, 
and the law remains amorphous.
94
 What is clear, however, is that a mere 
assertion of a parent-subsidiary relationship is insufficient to impute the 
acts or jurisdiction of one party to the other given that one of the primary 
purposes of the relationship is to limit liability.
95
  
 
 
 90. John H. Matheson, The Modern Law of Corporate Groups: An Empirical Study of Piercing 
the Corporate Veil in the Parent-Subsidiary Context, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1091, 1094 (2009). 
 91. Bryan A. Garner, GARNER’S DICTIONARY OF LEGAL USAGE 676 (3d. ed. 2011).  
 92. United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 62 (1998).  
 93. Matheson, supra note 90, at 1095. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Though piercing the veil is a separate question from extending jurisdiction, it is useful to 
address both principles because courts frequently combine these analyses when looking at agency 
relationships. As one court noted,  
It is useful to distinguish situations in which liability is imposed on a parent because of the 
existence of the agency relation, in our common-law understanding of that relation, from 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss4/6
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B. Agency in the Parent-Subsidiary Relationship 
One way to pierce the veil in a parent-subsidiary relationship is to 
claim that the subsidiary was acting as an agent of the parent, thus making 
the parent liable for the subsidiary’s actions.96 This same reasoning can be 
used to extend jurisdiction from the parent to the subsidiary. Returning to 
the introductory hypothetical, the argument would be that since the United 
States has jurisdiction over Clare, and Caro is acting as an agent of Clare, 
the United States also has jurisdiction over Caro. Agency is not assumed 
in a parent-subsidiary relationship; it depends on a showing of consent by 
both the parent (the principal) and the subsidiary (the agent) that the 
subsidiary would act on the parent’s behalf and be subject to the parent’s 
control.
97
 Indeed, “the ability of the parent corporation to control the 
actions of the subsidiary is the predicate for liability and jurisdiction based 
on agency.”98  
 
 
cases in which the corporate veil of the subsidiary is pierced for other reasons of policy. 
Unfortunately, however, the courts have not always observed the distinction between these 
two separate bases for parent’s liability. When liability is fastened upon the parent it is said 
that the subsidiary is a “mere agent.” The result has been a weakening and muddying of the 
term “agent” and a failure by courts to state the real reasons for their decisions.  
Bowoto v. Chevron Texaco Corp., 312 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1239 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (citing RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14M reporter’s note (1958)).  
 96. See supra note 85.  
 97. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1958). Some agency relationships are 
straightforward. See, e.g., Indictment, United States v. Jeffrey Tesler, No. 09-CR-098 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 
17, 2009) (UK citizen who was hired by a U.S. company, among others, handling bribe payments to 
Nigerian officials); Indictment, United States v. Ousama M. Naaman, No. 08-CR-246-ESH (D.D.C. 
Aug. 7, 2008) (Lebanese/Canadian dual national negotiating contracts with the Iraqi Ministry of Oil on 
behalf of a U.S. parent company and foreign subsidiary); Information, United States v. Ingersoll-Rand 
Italiana SpA, No. 07-CR-294-RJL (D.D.C. Oct. 31, 2007) (Jordanian company, Company X, serving 
as an agent and intermediary between a foreign subsidiary of a U.S. company and the government of 
Iraq); Indictment, United States v. Hans Bodmer, No. 03-CR-947-SAS (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2003) 
(Swiss lawyer representing a New York-based company, among others, in facilitating bribe payments 
to Azeri officials). 
 98. Brown, supra note 43, at 355. Brown also details the jurisprudence on parent-subsidiary 
relationships up to 2001. Id. at 350–57. As he notes, “a foreign parent corporation does not become 
subject to in personam jurisdiction simply because its subsidiary is located in the United States” (and, 
presumably, vice versa when the parent corporation is in the U.S. and the subsidiary is abroad). Id. at 
351. Lestelle discusses the principal-agent relationship in the context of torts and contracts. See 
Lestelle, supra note 78, at 533–34. Liability of the principal is established  
if the agent acts with actual authority in committing the tort; if the principal is negligent in 
supervising, selecting, or controlling the agent; or if the principal owes a duty to a third party, 
and the agent to whom the principal has delegated performance of the duty fails in such duty. 
Id. at 534. However, he then further notes that it appears that “foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies 
who do not act as agents of their parent corporation and who act on their own behalf are excluded from 
the FCPA.” Id. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce also issued a report where it detailed suggested 
amendments to the FCPA and outlined problems with expansive parent-subsidiary liability. ANDREW 
WEISSMANN & ALIXANDRA SMITH, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, RESTORING BALANCE: 
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If a plaintiff wants to assign liability based on an agency relationship, 
he bears the burden of proving that relationship existed.
99
 Courts have not 
agreed on a clear test for this relationship, particularly because “the 
inquiry is inherently fact-specific.”100 But the D.C. Circuit articulated a 
standard that is widely cited:  
At a minimum . . . we can confidently state that the relationship of 
principal and agent does not obtain unless the parent has manifested 
its desire for the subsidiary to act upon the parent’s behalf, the 
subsidiary has consented so to act, the parent has the right to 
exercise control over the subsidiary with respect to matters 
entrusted to the subsidiary, and the parent exercises its control in a 
manner more direct than by voting a majority of the stock in the 
subsidiary or making appointments to the subsidiary’s Board of 
Directors.
101
 
Courts have applied similarly rigorous tests when determining whether 
jurisdiction over one party can be imputed to the other. For example, 
jurisdiction may be extended where “the subsidiaries are created by the 
parent, for tax or corporate finance purposes, to carry on business on its 
behalf, [so that] there is no basis for distinguishing between the business 
of the parent and the business of the subsidiaries.”102 Or it may be 
extended only when “the subsidiary was either established for, or is 
engaged in, activities that, but for the existence of the subsidiary, the 
parent would have to undertake itself.”103 Thus, while there is not one 
clear test for determining agency, courts generally apply tests focusing on 
the parent’s control over the subsidiary, looking for a sufficient level of 
control to justify viewing the two as one entity.
104
  
 
 
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 22–24 (2010), available at 
http://ilr.iwssites.com/uploads/sites/1/restoringbalance_fcpa.pdf. 
 99. See Arriba Ltd. v. Petroleos Mexicanos, 962 F.2d 528, 533–34 (5th Cir. 1992).  
 100. Transamerica Leasing, Inc. v. La Republica de Venezuela, 200 F.3d 843, 849 (D.C. Cir. 
2000). 
 101. Id. (emphasis added); see also S & Davis Int’l, Inc. v. Republic of Yemen, 218 F.3d 1292, 
1299 (11th Cir. 2000) (applying the standard from Transamerica Leasing).  
 102. Bellomo v. Pa. Life Co., 488 F. Supp. 744, 746 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
 103. Gallagher v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 781 F. Supp. 1079, 1084 (E.D. Pa. 1992).  
 104. 1 COX & HAZEN, supra note 85, § 7:16.  
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C. The Agency Test in FCPA Cases 
The agency problem in FCPA cases is not that this control test has been 
incorrectly applied; it is that the SEC has signaled that it may assert 
jurisdiction on an agency theory based purely on the existence of a parent-
subsidiary relationship, without applying the test at all.
105
 The SEC’s anti-
bribery jurisdiction is limited to issuers and their employees or agents. 
Thus, if the SEC wants to assert jurisdiction over a non-issuer foreign 
party, it has to prove that the party is either an agent or employee of an 
issuer. As evidenced above, that analysis is complicated and fact-
intensive. But in at least one recent case, the SEC claimed jurisdiction 
over a non-issuer foreign company just by claiming it was owned and 
controlled by its issuer parent.
106
 As happens with most FCPA cases, the 
non-issuer settled without challenging jurisdiction,
107
 leaving open a 
troublesome question: can the SEC assert jurisdiction over a non-issuer 
foreign party simply because its parent company is an issuer?
108
  
The answer, clearly, is no. The law has clear rules and precedent for 
evaluating an agency relationship, whether the U.S. arm is the subsidiary 
or the parent. A mere parent-subsidiary relationship is insufficient to 
establish jurisdiction without evidence that the parent had some control 
 
 
 105. The clearest example of this failure appeared in the SEC action against Snamprogetti 
Netherlands in the Bonny Island bribery case. Information, United States v. Snamprogetti Neth. B.V., 
No. 10-CR-460 (S.D. Tex. July 7, 2010); see also SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, supra note 41, at 1. 
Snamprogetti is not a U.S. issuer; the SEC asserted jurisdiction in an anti-bribery action against 
Snamprogetti by claiming it acted as an agent of its issuer parent, ENI. Complaint, Secs. & Exch. 
Comm’n v. ENI, S.p.A., No. 4:10-cv-2414 (S.D. Tex. July 7, 2010). In its discussion of jurisdiction, 
the SEC noted that Snamprogetti Netherlands used the mails, means, or instrumentalities of interstate 
commerce to violate the FCPA, and that “Snamprogetti was a wholly-owned subsidiary of 
Snamprogetti, S.p.A., an Italian company, which in turn was a wholly-owned subsidiary of ENI during 
the relevant time period.” Id. at 2–3. 
 106. The SEC did not present any facts to support the agency claim. The SEC’s only jurisdictional 
claims were that ENI owned Snamprogetti, did not ensure its compliance with ENI policies, and had 
control over Snamprogetti “during the relevant time and on certain of its business decisions, such as 
Snamprogetti’s entry into the joint venture.” Complaint, supra note 105, at 4; SHEARMAN & STERLING 
LLP, supra note 41.  
 107. Secs. & Exch. Comm’n v. ENI, S.p.A. & Snamprogetti Neth., B.V., Case No. 4:10-cv-02414, 
S.D. Tex. (Houston), Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Act Release No. 3,149, 98 SEC Docket 
2973, 2010 WL 2685825 (July 7, 2010); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Snamprogetti 
Netherlands B.V. Resolves Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigation and Agrees to Pay $240 
Million Criminal Penalty (July 7, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/July/10-crm-
780.html (on file with author).  
 108. SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, supra note 41, at 4; see also SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP, ANOTHER 
SIGN OF AGGRESSIVE FCPA ENFORCEMENT: THE SEC BRINGS ANTI-BRIBERY CHARGES AGAINST A 
NON-ISSUER (Aug. 10, 2010), available at http://www.sidley.com/Another-Sign-of-Aggressive-FCPA-
Enforcement--The-SEC-Brings-Anti-Bribery-Charges-Against-a-Non-Issuer-08-10-2010 (follow “To 
View this Sidley Update as a PDF click here”).  
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over or knowledge of the subsidiary’s corrupt actions. Although this legal 
principle is clear, its application may not be. As previously discussed, 
FCPA cases rarely go to trial, and jurisdictional challenges are nearly non-
existent. Thus, this application of parent-subsidiary liability, while likely 
improper, creates significant risks for U.S. parent companies with foreign 
subsidiaries. It threatens the normal limited liability rules for a parent-
subsidiary relationship and opens the possibility that companies will have 
to choose between a risky jurisdictional challenge or an expensive 
settlement for conduct over which they may have had no control. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
A strong FCPA is essential in the continuing fight against corruption 
and bribery around the world. U.S. anti-bribery efforts through the FCPA 
have shaped the global fight against corruption. Assertive enforcement is 
needed as the problem continues everywhere. The harms of corruption are 
very real for U.S. businesses, citizens of developing economies, and the 
stability of a globalized world.
109
 The DOJ and SEC’s aggressive 
enforcement strategies are a logical response to the ongoing pervasiveness 
of corruption. However, it is essential for the DOJ and SEC to shape 
enforcement strategies with an understanding of how enforcement can 
both advance and detract from the laudable goals of the FCPA.
110
  
An enforcement philosophy that focuses on prosecution wherever it 
may be possible is misguided. That approach is myopic and will always 
fall short of FCPA goals. Overly aggressive prosecution punishes actors 
who may be trying to comply and encourages corrupt actors to find ways 
to work around U.S. jurisdiction. In an era where the United States is 
already concerned about economic competition from growing foreign 
economies, it does not want to enforce policies in a way that encourages 
companies to look elsewhere to do business. FCPA enforcement should 
meet the requirements of fairness and comport with international norms 
and due process. To do so, the DOJ and SEC must take a holistic approach 
that moves away from a prosecute-wherever-possible philosophy toward a 
 
 
 109. Professor Salbu notes that “[j]ust as intrusive legislation poses a threat to global peace, 
rampant bribery in the post-Cold War era potentially undermines world order, particularly as it harms 
struggling nations, where fair and efficient economic development is critically important.” Salbu, 
supra note 75, at 433 (footnotes omitted). 
 110. Professor Spalding notes that FCPA “legislation should create a disincentive to bribe but not 
a disincentive to invest. . . . [W]hile it is good to deter bribery, it is far better to deter bribery that 
occurs in the course of ongoing business activity. Promoting ethical business in emerging markets is 
precisely the purpose of the FCPA.” Spalding, supra note 10, at 401. 
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plan that is consistent, collaborative with companies who are self-
reporting and building compliance programs, and supportive of foreign 
governments waging their own anti-corruption battles. 
Natasha N. Wilson
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